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PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ERISA
JuLus G. GETmAN*
It is my function to generalize after listening to the commen-
tary of the experts on the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA). 1 Because I am not a scholar in this field I can offer
a different perspective on what we have heard.
The speakers are in agreement about several points. First,
there is the importance of ERISA, which stems from the amounts
of money involved and the impact on pensions and people's lives.2
This aspect of the statute influences the way it is applied and the
manner in which the law develops. Second, ERISA is in the pro-
cess of change. This is best illustrated through a comparison of
ERISA to basic labor law, a subject that I teach.3 Congress enacts
statutory amendments to the National Labor Relations Act every
twelve to fifteen years.' With ERISA, however, statutory changes
Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 832 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988). Congress has declared that benefit plans "sub-
stantially affect the revenues of the United States because they are afforded preferen-
tial federal tax treatment." Id. Furthermore, it found that "despite the enormous
growth in such plans many employees with long years of employment are losing antic-
ipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans." Id.
The following statistics exemplify the economic importance of pension plans:
In 1975, the first full calendar year in which ERISA was on the books, there
were approximately 340,000 total retirement plans, covering over 44.5 mil-
lion participants and beneficiaries. These plans had assets of over $543 bil-
lion. By the end of 1983, the number of private pension plans had more than
doubled, totaling more than 775,000 and covering almost 67 million partici-
pants, and their assets were approximately $900 billion.
Francis X. Lilly, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 35 LAB. L.J. 603, 604
(1984). It is estimated that pension plan assets will total three trillion dollars by 1995.
Id.; see Julianne J. Knox, Comment, Nieto v. Ecker: Incorporation of Nonfiduciary
Liability Under ERISA, 73 MNN. L. REV. 1303, 1303 n.2 (1989) (explaining increase
in pension plan assets since ERISA's enactment).
3 Of course the term "labor law" has become somewhat of a misnomer. The sub-
ject is actually labor union management relations.
4 Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. Section 152 of the
Act is comparable to § 1002 of ERISA as they are both general definition sections. Yet
this section has only been amended three times since enactment. 29 U.S.C. § 152
(1935), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 152 (Supp. V 1946), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 152(2),
(14) (Supp. IV 1974), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (Supp. II 1978).
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occur on a far more frequent basis.5 It is an area of the law that is
evolving at a rapid pace.
Third, ERISA is a politically sensitive subject. This is exem-
plified by the different congressional committees that have
claimed credit for ERISA's passage or have exercised jurisdiction
over it,6 as well as by the power of the political groups involved in
making and changing the law.7
All of these themes lead to a major conclusion: ERISA is a
highly technical, complicated area of the law.
One reason for its complexity is the size of the statute itself.'
A statute comprising over four hundred sections will inevitably
lead to a great deal of complexity. Another cause of ERISA's com-
plexity is its overlap with other statutes, such as the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA")9 and bankruptcy law.10 This causes
not only complexity but conflict as well. Moreover, there are con-
5 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
6 The fact that ERISA is affected by different congressional groups is most vividly
illustrated in the statute itself. Section 1132(h) states:
A copy of the complaint in any action under this subchapter [relating to civil
enforcement] by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary... shall be served
upon the Secretary [of Labor] and the Secretary of the Treasury by certified
mail. Either Secretary shall have the right in his discretion to intervene in
any action ....
29 U.S.C. § 1132(h) (1988).
The statute emerged from a joint effort of four committees: the House Ways and
Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, the House Education and Labor
Committee, and the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee. General Motors
Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 1980).
Furthermore, as it relates to fiduciary matters, ERISA grants exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(h) (1988); Note, Fiduciary Respon-
sibility: Prudent Investments Under ERISA, 14 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 1066, 1067 n.11
(1980).
For a discussion of ERISA and how it relates to securities law see Douglas A.
Love, ERISA: The Law Versus Economics, 25 GA. L. REV. 135, 136-39 (1990).
7 For example, consumer advocate organizations and employer groups are influ-
ential in changing and affecting ERISA law. See Pension Reforms in Trade Bill Repre-
sent Employer Victory, Aide Says, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1847 (Oct. 3,
1994); Special Report-Committee Battles Over Claims Foreshadow Bigger ERISA,
HEALTH LEGIS. & REG., June 8, 1994, sec. no. 23, vol. 20. These two politically influen-
tial groups are often working for opposite results. Id.
8 The mere number of sections in the statute itself exemplifies this point. 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
9 See generally Kathlynn L. Butler, Securing Employee Health Benefits Through
ERISA and the ADA, 42 EMORY L.J. 1197, 1235-42 (1993). The author suggests that
"the EEOC, under the ADA rather than ERISA, is attempting to address ERISA's
flaws by claiming that disability-based distinctions in health plans are prohibited un-
less the employer can prove that distinctions are, in fact, not discriminatory or that a
legitimate business justification is the basis for such distinction." Id. at 1240.
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flicting policies within the statute itself, which is to be expected
because of the complicated statutory regulation of pensions.
Because of the amount of money involved and because the
technical aspects of the law make it so difficult to understand and
control, a case can be made for more regulation. For example, the
misuse of pension funds is one of the greatest areas of union cor-
ruption, largely due to the amount of money involved.1 ' The bil-
lions of dollars at stake12 have made it tempting for people to try
to control the use of pension funds and have led to a series of
abuses.' 3 Such opportunities for abuse are equally available to
employers.' 4 Employers can save an enormous amount of money
if they delay making contributions to pension funds for a period of
time. This provides a great temptation to use the funds for pur-
poses other than those specified in the pension plans. To prevent
the misuse of funds, a more complex statutory scheme is neces-
sary. Yet greater complexity means additional problems.
The more complex a law is, the more likely it is that it will be
violated. Mr. Sirkin pointed out that there are thousands of inad-
vertent, and probably thousands of intentional, violations of the
law.' 5 ERISA's complexity makes it easy to make a mistake and
10 See, e.g., Note, Exemption of ERISA Benefits Under Section 552(b)(2)(A) Of The
Bankruptcy Code, 83 MICH. L. REv. 214 (1984).
11 But see OIG's View of DOL Enforcement Problems Is "Overblown," Borzi Tells
Conference, Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 983 (June 4, 1990) (explaining one
person's view that private pension system should not be compared to savings and loan
crisis).
12 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988).
14 The abuses of many pensions spurred the development of the ERISA statute
and guided its inclusion of the trustee and fiduciary aspects of the law. See Knox,
supra note 2, at 1311-22.
Specifically stated, "[blefore ERISA, trustee abuse and corruption through self-
dealing, imprudent investments, and misappropriations of employee benefit plan
fumds prevented many participants from receiving their benefits." Knox, supra note 2,
at 1306; see also Testimony on ERISA Enforcement Before The House Government
Operations Subcommittee on Employment and Housing, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
148, at D-1 (Aug. 3, 1989) [hereinafter Testimony].
15 See Testimony, supra note 17. This report relates the findings of a study con-
ducted by the Department of Labor's Inspector General on 168 private pension plans
during the period of July 1986 through July 1987. Id. The Inspector General found:
$18.7 million in misused assets... either were not found, or not disclosed
during routine independent audits. This is a rate of 0.3% in misused as-
sets-not an alarming proportion unless the samples is [sic] projected to the
total dollars in private pensions. If the 0.3% violation rate holds for all plans,
we may be talking about more than $4 billion in misused assets.
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tempting to intentionally violate the law under the guise of mis-
take. Therefore, the law will be routinely violated.
Complex statutes are inevitably difficult to enforce. 1 6 En-
forcement of a statute of this magnitude and complexity requires a
major bureaucracy. The need for this type of bureaucracy, how-
ever, is arising at a time when public opinion is strongly opposed
to governmental expansion. Furthermore, the President's plan to
"re-invent" government really amounts to reducing the number of
federal employees." It would be difficult to reconcile today's hos-
tility toward increasing bureaucracy' s with the need for the ex-
panded bureaucracy required to enforce ERISA. Enforcing the
statute selectively would create more complexity, confusion, and
political resentment.
The good news for academics such as myself, David Gregory,
and the members of the St. John's Law Review is that all of this
complexity, confusion, and conflicting policies make this a ripe
area for study. In fact, even after a great deal of litigation on the
subject,' 9 this remains an area about which we know very little.
What we do know is that ERISA is as important as it is
complicated.
We need to learn more by investigating the workings of ER-
ISA. In fact, one of the themes expressed throughout the sympo-
sium is that this is an area that requires not just an analysis of
case law, but a careful and critical examination of what is evolving
in the various practice areas that have been discussed. Although
the point is easy to make, it proves to be enormously difficult to
accomplish.
16 See generally New Task Force on ERISA Enforcement Established to Examine
Problem Areas, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 172, at A-3 (Sept. 5, 1985); Pensions, Pen-
sion Dispute Resolution Proposal Seen As Potentially Valuable Enforcement Tool,
Daily Rep. (BNA) No. 180, at A-2 (Sept. 17, 1991).
17 See Elizabeth Schwinn, Re-Invented Government to Pay Crime Bill's Tab, SAN
DIEGO UNmoN-TRB., Aug. 28, 1994, at A14 ("The re-inventing government proposal
designed by Vice President Gore is targeted to cut the 2.1-million-person federal work
force by about 221,000 by 1999.").
18 See Bureaucracy in America, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1993, at 16 ("Ameri-
cans say they hate government, and many mean it."); David E. Rosenbaum, Remaking
Government: Few Disagree with Clinton's Overall Goal, but History Shows the Obsta-
cles Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1993, at Al ("The bureaucracy is bloated, wasteful
and inefficient.").
19 See Monica Gallagher, Recent Developments in Concepts Relating to Fiduciary
Liability, 16 FORUM 753, 753 (1981) ("During those few years [1974-1979] there have
been more than 3000 lawsuits filed under Title I....").
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Some of the questions that need to be explored are: Is there
too much regulation?2 ° Should ERISA be market driven? Should
the fiduciary obligation be market driven? Should states be given
greater power? Where should the regulatory power be located?21
Finally, we must address questions related to harmonizing ERISA
with other laws.22 One of the things I think this symposium has
done is to identify questions that should have been raised long
ago. I hope our discussion today will lead to more in-depth re-
search in many of these different areas.
I had another more idiosyncratic response to this symposium,
peculiar to a person who remains academically interested in labor
management relations and the role of unions. Most of my scholar-
ship has dealt with unions,23 but few of the speakers today have
even used the term union. Professor Stein mentioned it, but that
was in regard to something that took place twenty years ago when
unions were powerful and important.
20 See Richard C. Reuben, The Pension Law Squeeze: As Companies Reconsider
Retirement Plans, ERISA Lawyers Have Less Work, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 12 ("Con-
gress and the IRS have 'cut back on the tax benefits and increased the burden of
compliance to the point where many employers today are saying it's just not worth it'
.... ") (quoting Kirk F. Maldonado, employee benefits lawyer with Riordan & McKin-
zie, Costa Mesa, Cal.).
21 In regard to the self-funded employee benefit plans, those governed by ERISA
afford employers less protection than those governed by state regulations. See
Swedback, supra note 12, at 788-93.
22 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 744 n.21
(1985) ("Thus application of the McCarran-Ferguson Act lends further support to our
ruling that Congress did not intend mandated-benefit laws to be pre-empted by ER-
ISA."); see also Helene Yvette Spielman Sherman, Note, ERISA Benefits Under Bank-
ruptcy Code and a New York Debtor's Rights, 58 BRooy. L. REV. 177, 178-83 (1992)
(discussing issue of whether ERISA plans are included in debtor's estate for purposes
of Bankruptcy Code); Whitman F. Manley, Note, Civil Actions Under ERISA Section
502(a): When Should Courts Require That Claimants Exhaust Arbitral or Intrafund
Remedies?, 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 952, 954-56 (1986) (discussing ERISA claims which
arise out of Labor Management Relations Act of 1947); John M. Walker, Note, The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: An Overview of ERISA Pre-Emp-
tion, 17 A. J. TniAL ADvoc. 529 (1993) (discussing ERISA preemption of state laws).
23 Julius G. Getman, The Courts and Collective Bargaining, 59 C .-Ksrr L. REV.
969 (1983) [hereinafter Getman, Collective Bargaining]; Julius G. Getman, Labor
Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REv. 4
(1984); Julius G. Getman, The Changing Role of Courts and the Potential Role of Un-
ions in Overcoming Employment Discrimination, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1477 (1990); Julius
G. Getman, Ruminations on Union Organizing in the Private Sector, 53 U. Cm. L.
REV. 45 (1986); Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transi-
tion: The Paper Industry Example, 102 YALE L.J. 1803 (1993); Julius G. Getman &
Thomas C. Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Response to Profes-
sor Epstein, 92 YALE L.J. 1415 (1983).
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In considering the connections between unions and ERISA, I
think of my father who was only ten years old when he began as a
garment worker in the early 1900s. At the time, there was a great
deal of discrimination against senior employees, who were often
replaced simply because someone younger was willing to work at
lower wages. There was no health care and no pensions. The lives
of senior workers were characterized by feelings of insecurity,
fear, and anxiety.
Collective bargaining was the first method used to address
such issues. The unions fostered the concept of seniority, by
which employees, over time, developed a legally recognizable in-
terest in the job, a form of ownership which offered job protection
to older employees.2 4 A senior employee could not so easily be re-
placed. Although the concept of seniority has developed a bad rep-
utation,25 at the time it was first developed in collective bargain-
ing the idea that workers owned a piece of their job was
revolutionary. 26 Courts have slowly adopted the notion, but the
process would probably have taken another fifty years without the
efforts of the unions. Unions, of course, also pioneered the negoti-
ation of health and pension plans for employees.
Today legal regulations and government mandates are taking
the place of the union. This increasing governmental role can be
interpreted in two very contradictory ways. One fairly common
point of view is that unions are no longer needed because the gov-
ernment is now doing their job. I take the opposite view. I believe
that if we lose an institution which has played such a major a role
24 See Getman, Collective Bargaining, supra note 28, at 969 ("The widespread use
of seniority as a result of collective bargaining and the almost automatic limitation on
the employer's right to discharge have helped to establish the idea that employees,
through their work, develop a legally enforceable claim to their jobs ... .").
25 See RicHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 133
(1984) ("There are obvious costs of seniority, such as possible reductions in efficiency
as workers find merit to be less well rewarded .... ").
26 But see MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, POWER AND PRIVILEGE: LABOR UNIONS IN
AMERICA 253-54 (1984) ("Regarding jobs as property rights is not progressive. It is a
return to the restrictions of two centuries ago when workers could not freely contract
for mutually profitable employment. It is a mild form of slavery, with employers pros-
ecuted as law breakers when they seek to terminate or revise an employee's service.
Over the long run, it is just another complication in the bewildering maze of restric-
tions on productive activities, with losses spread over all income earners and consum-
ers in the economy.").
27 FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 30, at 62. "[U]nions have a sizable positive
impact on the provision of fringe programs and on the dollars spent on fringes, with
the percentage increase in fringe spending attributable to unionism exceeding the
percentage increase in wages attributable to unionism." Id.
[Vol. 68:473
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in developing the concept of dignity for employees,28 we risk losing
innovations similar to pensions, health care, and seniority.29 Soci-
ety would suffer a great loss. ERISA serves as a reminder of what
society stands to lose should the union movement in the United
States continue to disintegrate.
I am aware that organized labor bears a considerable amount
of the blame for its own demise.30 Yet, we should bear in mind the
achievements of labor unions long ago3" when they were much
more vital institutions.2 If unions do not become revitalized, it
will be a loss to society. On that note I will end. I enjoyed listen-
ing to everyone today. I believe that this panel has taught me
something about the law and has given me a greater appreciation
of the importance of ERISA, for which I thank you.
28 See REYNOLDS, supra note 31, at 246.
Labor unions give 'workers' (presumably the 'little people') a sense of place, a
sense of belonging in an otherwise rootless, changing industrial-technical so-
ciety. As a source of traditional authority, unions are valuable for their reac-
tionary guildlike nature. Tribal organizations confer 'dignity' and status on
individuals and lift them out of a role as depersonalized cogs in an immense
machine.
Id.
29 But see REYNOLDs, supra note 31, at 38. ('These services [insurance and retire-
ment programs] .. are valuable, but unions, particularly adversarial unions, are not
needed to perform them. And many nonunion enterprises today are demonstrating
this.").
30 Unions have brought about their own demise through "the insulation of union
leaders from their members, discriminatory, [sic] denial of membership and unfair
discipline, and non-democratic selection of officers." Julius G. Getman, Dedication:
Clyde Summers, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 621, 621 (1990). Other commentators have attrib-
uted the demise to ideological changes-"the abandonment of the early social union-
ism of the CIO in favor of a modem version of business unionism," or "a shift from a
collectivist, egalitarian ethic to an individual one." KmI MOODY, AN INJURY To ALL:
THm DECLINE OF AMERICAN UNIoNIsM xvi (1988).
31 See, e.g., MOODY, supra note 35, at 1-2 (recalling 116-day steel strike of 1959,
which resulted in steel workers gaining wage increases, pension and health insurance
improvements, and cost of living allowances).
32 Union membership has been declining since 1979. MOODY, supra note 35, at 4.
The percentage of U.S. workers in unions has been declining since 1954. MICHAEL
GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE U.S. xiv (1987).
[U]nions today are on the defensive and reeling from repeated defeats. Con-
cessions to companies in recent contract bargaining-, loss of any national
political influence; employer-led union busting, failures in new organizing;
and the disintegration of decades long stable bargaining relations in many
major industries, including construction, trucking, air, and coal mining...."
1994]

